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Metaphysical foundations of neoclassical mechanics 
 
MARIUS STAN  
 
I examine here if Kant’s metaphysics of matter can support any late-modern versions of classical 
mechanics. I argue that in principle it can, by two different routes. I assess the interpretive costs 
of each approach, and recommend the most promising strategy, viz. the mass-point approach. 
 
 
The most influential current accounts of Kant’s philosophy of physics have it 
that our latter-day science of nature has shown his doctrine to be too narrow, 
thus no longer tenable in its original strong form. Its most glaring limitation 
is the geometric and chronometric structure—or determinate space and time 
content—to which Kant wedded it. Modern gravitation theory has shown that 
structure to be valid just in the classical limit. Thus, prominent interpreters 
have concluded, Kant’s philosophical foundation must be read in light of the 
best science of his time, not ours—specifically, in dialogue with Newton’s 
Principia, the high noon of early modern physics.    
Suppose we are in the ‘classical belt’ of the world, where masses and 
speeds are low enough that relativistic theory is not needed. Has Kant’s phi-
losophy been refuted for that realm too? I claim that it has not. His views, I 
argue, remain as relevant as classical mechanics is alive, despite some 
premature reports of its demise in the wake of Einstein. To see my point, 
however, we must turn away from space- or time structure and the Tran-
scendental Aesthetic that legitimizes it. The most viable part of Kant’s foun-
dations, I suggest, is the transcendental logic—in its more determinate form 
as a constitution theory for objecthood in mechanics.1    
                                                             
1 Constitution theory is Kant’s account of the ‘forms’ that constitute the object of experience—
specifically, the two forms of sensibility, and the conceptual structure supplied by the under-
standing. Here I am interested in the latter. I refer to Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Nat-
ural Science simply as ‘Foundations,’ and cite it by volume and page number in the Academy 
Edition, from Kant 2004. 
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Is that not a tall order? Will it not require me to try and defend anew the 
completeness of Kant’s table of categories? No, not really. I am not asking 
here, what in the Transcendental Analytic can still explain the possibility of 
experience. Rather, I follow the Marburg neo-Kantians as I carve a new path 
alongside theirs. From Hermann Cohen to Michael Friedman, they have in-
vestigated how radical change of inertial structure affects Kantian doctrine. I 
bracket their question entirely as I pursue my novel path. That is, I take clas-
sical structure—Galilean kinematics, Euclidean parallel transport, and abso-
lute simultaneity—for granted, and focus instead on the axiomatic structure 
of mechanical theory. More exactly, I ask: what is the broadest genus of ob-
ject for modern classical mechanics that we can anchor in Kant’s catego-
ries and sensible forms? This question, I claim, has a cogent answer that 
shows Kant’s metaphysics of material nature is viable and relevant, if we re-
strict it to its proper domain.  
From my new vantage point, there is another ground for optimism. The 
conceptual basis of modern mechanics is an edifice with four parts: 1) fun-
damental kinematics, 2) a matter theory, 3) dynamical laws and 4) a doctrine 
of objectivity. Kant had already anticipated this architecture, and called these 
parts Phoronomy, Dynamics, Mechanics, and Phenomenology, respectively. 
If we look at them from the perspective I have outlined, new insight emerges 
into his constitution theory of mechanical objects—and a new answer be-
comes possible to the question: Do Kant’s metaphysical foundations survive 
the challenge of modern science?  
The question also bears directly on the central theme in this volume. We 
may regard Kant’s constitutive principles in Foundations as laws broadly 
conceived:  basic kinematic laws, laws of material constitution, general dy-
namical laws, and laws of mechanical objectivity. Then we can rephrase my 
question above as follows: are the laws of his ‘metaphysics of corporeal na-
ture’ still the laws of nature in a classical regime? Answer: yes.  
But, I must qualify my subject. Mechanics post-Principia is really the 
confluence of two broad streams of theory, viz. Newton-Euler dynamics and 
‘analytic’ mechanics. I set the latter entirely aside here. It poses serious chal-
lenges to my project, far from easy to solve, though I hope not intractable. I 
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acknowledge them, and move on to examine Kant’s chances of grounding the 
former. That holds out more promise and reward.  
Still, the path to my conclusion is not apparent. Even circumscribed as 
Newton-Euler theory, modern mechanics rests on two distinct fundamental 
objects, viz. the mass-point and the deformable continuum.2 Each object by 
itself supports a comprehensive theory of classical mechanics. And, neither 
is explainable in terms of the other—they are mutually irreducible objects. 
Thus, from the stance I take here, we cannot answer my question above di-
rectly. So, I respond with a blend of reconstruction and hermeneutics. I spell 
out modern constitutive assumptions for the two objects above, and examine 
two respective strategies for embedding them in Foundations. Against that 
backdrop, I recommend the least disruptive path for the interpreter. Ipso fac-
to that is also a case for the viability of Kant’s metaphysical foundations.  
Fortunately, Kant himself will help me in my enterprise. It is often 
thought that Foundations is a univocal account of a single kind of mechanical 
object. As I will show, that is not true. Kant speaks there in two voices, per-
haps unwittingly, and he wavers between two species of object, discrete and 
continuous. This raises the question, which is really his considered view—or, 
at least, which view is easier to defend on his behalf? My study thus is not just 
a case for Kant’s continued relevance; it is also a fresh look at the deep struc-
ture of Foundations, which Kant obscures with his architectonic-driven 
mode of presentation.  
However, his vacillation is hard to see without help from modern theory. 
Accordingly, I start with it, by spelling out material constitution, fundamental 
kinematics, dynamical laws, and objectivity criteria for a mass-point, the first 
kind of mechanical object (§ 1). And, I do the same for the second kind, viz. 
the deformable continuum (§ 2). Then I turn to Kant, and examine the re-
sources for grounding either object in his constitution theory (§ 3). I end by 
assessing and recommending the most promising approach (§ 4).3           
                                                             
2 There is a third unit of matter, the rigid body, which I leave out here. Kant argued resolutely 
against it, and it would be hard to brush that aside. And, the rigid body is the preferred ontology 
of analytic mechanics, which I have set aside for now, as I explained above. 
3 Sections 1 and 2 are synoptic capsules that rely variously on Hamel 1909, Joos 1934, Malvern 
1969, Truesdell 1991, Gurtin, Fried & Anand 2010, and Wilson 2013.  
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‘Neoclassical’ denotes a certain presentation of mechanics, more rigor-
ous than the partial and often implicit ‘classical’ version of Newton and Kant, 
but less formal than the ‘post-classical’ axiomatizations of Noll and his 
school.  
 
1.  The mass-point approach 
Kant’s Dynamics is really a matter theory, and so its modern equivalent 
would be an account of material constitution. (I mean that as in physical the-
ory, not intuition-based analytic metaphysics.) In current terms, one type of 
basic object, or unit of matter, is an entity the size of a point. This zero-sized 
object is endowed with two causally efficient, scalar-valued properties: iner-
tial mass and charge (of various types). Mass grounds impenetrability in that 
no two masses can be superimposed, or made to occupy the same point-sized 
place simultaneously; resistance to acceleration by another mass-point; and 
the ability to carry and transfer momentum. Charges give rise to scalar fields 
around the point, and they in turn induce fields of acceleration at every loca-
tion for which they are defined. Some theorists capture these facts by saying 
that a point mass has no true size, just an effective volume. On this view, 
macroscopic bodies are discrete ensembles, and mass-points are their ulti-
mate actual parts.   
Kinematics.  An unconstrained mass-point has three degrees of free-
dom: three independent parameters specify its position completely. A motion 
is a change in any degree of freedom; there is no intrinsic spin.  
Because point masses are zero-sized and unconstrained ex suppositione, 
their basic kinematics is of quantities of straight-line motion, or time deriva-
tives of their rectilinear displacements. The key grounding assumption—
which Kant in Phoronomy grasped right away, and so we need to recover as 
we update his ‘phoronomic’ foundations—is that these quantities are addi-
tive; more generally, that they are linear combinations. (His preferred term 
for their additivity was ‘composition.’ Being directed magnitudes, he thought 
their additivity, ⊕, required explanation.) In light of that, a fundamental fact 
is that linear velocity vi is resolvable: 
 
vi = vx ⊕ vy ⊕ vz.          (1) 
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In words: it can be decomposed into, and recovered from, its projections, viz. 
component velocities relative to individual rigid coordinate axes x, y, z. An-
other basic fact is that velocity of translation can be parallel-transported:4  
 
vB in F = vF relative to G  ⊕  vB in G.       (2) 
 
This is really an expression for the Galilean transformation, the framing 
principle of classical particle kinematics. It licenses redescriptions of motion 
across inertial frames of reference. A last basic principle is that linear accel-
eration too is additive: 
 
at = a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ … ⊕ an.   (3) 
 
Namely, it is the vector sum of the single accelerations induced by individual 
mechanical agencies separately. In sum, the kinematic insights associated 
with this approach are: three degrees of freedom; and composition, or vector 
addition (with resolution as its correlate).       
Dynamics.  Kant called ‘Mechanics’ what we know as kinetics. Updated 
and tailored for the object of this approach, its ‘mechanical’ properties are 
these. The full-fledged mass-point is endowed with two action-kinds, repul-
sion and attraction. Both are central forces in the weak sense, i.e. they ema-
nate from the point where the mass resides—because they are induced 
through charges carried by that point. Usually, these forces are the negative 
gradients of scalar-field potentials:  
 
f = − ∇P           (4) 
 
Just as usually, these potentials are irrotational. Then the forces are central 
in the strong sense: they point toward or away from the center, and their vec-
tors lie on the straight line between the mass-points that exert and undergo 
them, respectively. Another to describe these strong-central forces is by let-
                                                             
4 In the indices, ‘in’ denotes velocity of mass points in respect to a frame, and ‘relative’ denotes 
velocities of frames relative to one another.  
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ting them be linear functions of some inverse power of the distance r between 
interacting particles:5  
 
f ∝ c ⋅ 1/rk.           (5) 
 
If a mass-point exerts both attraction and repulsion, and their respective 
force laws are species of f as in [5] above, it is easy to see that, on every radi-
us from the mass-point, there is a point P at some distance b where the two 
forces balance each other: their respective accelerations cancel out. For irro-
tational potentials, the geometric locus of all these zero-acceleration points is 
a surface, viz. a 2-sphere with the mass-point at the center. This sphere is 
that which the young Kant in his lucid moments called the “sphere of activi-
ty” of a physical monad.   
Beside laws of force-species as above, there are two dynamical laws of 
force generaliter. One is a version of Newton’s Lex Secunda; more exactly, it 
is a conjunction of two statements:  
 
fi = m ⋅ ai.           (6) 
 
In words, any force equals the mass of its target-point times the acceleration 
it would induce on the mass-point if it were the only force acting on it. And 
also, 
 
ft = f1 ⊕ f2 ⊕ … ⊕ fn.    (7) 
 
That is, impressed forces are linear-additive magnitudes. Often and tacitly, 
these two are stated together as the Second Law for mass-points: 
 
Σ fi = m ⋅  at.         (8) 
 
                                                             
5 Below, ‘c’ is a placeholder for algebraic combinations of dynamical factors—broadly speaking, 
types of charge and/or ratios of charge to mass. Uppercase boldface letters denote tensors, viz. 
3×3 matrices, lowercase boldface vectors, and lowercase italics scalars. 
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Namely, the resultant net force on a particle equals its mass times its effec-
tive acceleration. This ultimate dynamical principle of one-way action has a 
complement for interactions, the Third Law:     
 
fAB = − fBA.     (9) 
 
The force-vector on a mass-point B caused by a mass-point A is equal and 
opposite to the force-vector induced by B on A. In the standard case of mass-
points with strong-central actions, the constraint [5] on force-laws entails:6 
 
(rJ − rK) × fJK = 0.          (10) 
 
I.e., the impressed force by a mass-point J on another K is in the straight line 
between them. In turn, [10] together with the principle [9] make up a version 
suitably called the Strong Third Law: the mutual forces on two mass-points 
are equal, opposite, and collinear.   
Objectivity.  Finally, let us consider updating Kant’s Phenomenology for 
mass-points. Their kinematic quantities take different values depending on 
the frame to which we refer them, so the question arises, which of these 
quantities are objective? Put differently: what features of motion are observ-
er-independent?7  
In our time there are two broadly overlapping approaches to objectivity 
for these mechanical objects. 1) Determine what quantities of motion are Gal-
ilean-invariant: roughly, those having the same value for all the functions 
mapping a system of mass-points from one inertial frame into another while 
leaving their mechanical properties intact (McKinsey & Suppes 1955). From 
this standpoint, magnitude of linear acceleration counts as objective. 2) Es-
tablish the kinematic quantities inferable (from initial conditions) by means 
of the dynamical laws. Notoriously, these laws entail Newton’s Corollary V, 
which means that only acceleration is measurable by all observers. There is a 
complication here: this route allows certain unobservable linear accelera-
                                                             
6 The vector (rJ − rK) is the distance between the two mass-points J and K.  
7 I mean independent of particular observers. There is also a generic observer—the ‘transcen-
dental subject,’ or ‘subjectivity’ in general. In Kant’s doctrine, all kinematic quantities are sub-
jectivity-dependent. But of course not all vary with particular subjects.   
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tions.8 With that proviso in mind, it is plain that both approaches single out 
the same quantity. Thus, we may conclude, acceleration is objective—
perhaps up to a common linear acceleration factor—but not velocity or posi-
tion.  
I move now to the next framework, to see what it requires. It too has four 
parts, which function as modern analogues of Kant’s four disciplines in 
Foundations, adapted to continuous matter.  
 
2.  The deformable continuum approach 
The other paradigm of classical theory is continuum mechanics. Let us 
begin, again, with material constitution. To study extended bodies, continu-
um theory begins with an ‘Euler cut,’ a finite volume ∆V mentally carved out 
inside the body by a suitable intersection of planes or regular surfaces. There 
are two grounding assumptions. First, there exists a scalar function ρ, or 
mass density, defined everywhere in the cut, positive at every point; and also 
various charge density functions, also continuous everywhere. Second, any 
two material points in the cut can be moved relative to each other.9 To handle 
this entity mathematically, we shrink it to an infinitesimal size as a volume 
element, dV, which has a true size. In this theory macroscopic bodies are 
continuous wholes, and volume elements are their least, potential parts.     
Kinematics.  Because continuous matter is extended and deformable, its 
geometric behavior is much more complex than any possible motion of single 
mass-points. The term ‘transplacement’ is sometimes used for it, and it de-
notes a passing from a ‘reference’ to a ‘current’ configuration. A configura-
tion is a mapping of a continuous body B into a Euclidean frame E3 at some 
instant t. 
To stay with Kant’s preferred language of ‘composition’ in Phoronomy, a 
transplacement χ is any linear combination 
 
χ = F ⊕ t.     (11) 
                                                             
8 By Newton’s Corollary VI, a set of interacting mass-points may be subject to system-external 
forces that induce (at least within the boundaries of the system) a field of (nearly) equal and 
parallel acceleration: e.g. gravitational attraction by a very large body at a very large distance.  
9 The first constitutive assumption distinguishes continuous matter radically from mass-points; 
the second makes it radically distinct from rigid bodies.  
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Namely, a continuous-body motion is composed of a deformation F and a rig-
id translation t. Either can be zero, of course. Translations occur in mass-
points too, and are well understood. The topic of central interest in continu-
um mechanics is deformation, whose fundamental measure is the gradient F. 
To see what F means, start with the notion of a line element, or infinitesimal 
fiber, ds. That is any material line segment whose end-points are two infini-
tesimally close points P and Q in the body. At any point M, the deformation 
gradient maps fibers (terminating in M) from the reference into the current 
configuration.10 Globally, F informs about the change of shape and orienta-
tion of a continuous body. Locally, it tells us how fibers at M stretch, shrink 
and change mutual angles, i.e. rotate relative to each other. More exactly, let 
a curve s, parametrized by z(s), pass through M in the reference (unde-
formed) configuration; and let x(s) be the arc-length parameterization of the 
same curve in the deformed configuration. The deformation gradient F is the 
tensor of the partial derivatives of the ‘deformed’ fiber dx with respect to the 
‘undeformed’ fiber dz:   
 
 
F = ∂x/∂z     (12) 
 
Another useful way to gain insight into F is to think of dz as the vectors tan-
gent to all the curves s passing through M in the reference configuration; and 
of dx as the same tangent vectors in the current (deformed) configuration.  
A basic idea in continuum kinematics is the polar decomposition: 
 
F = R ⋅ U     (13) 
 
That is, a deformation can be seen as the product of a stretch tensor U and a 
rotation tensor R. Stretching and shearing line elements around a point re-
sults in strain, the basic kinematic state induced by stresses and inducing 
                                                             
10 If F has the same value at every point, the deformation is homogeneous, and inhomogeneous if 
F varies independently across the body.  
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stress in return. There are several gauges of strain; in elasticity and solid 
mechanics, a common measure is the (right) Cauchy-Green strain tensor C:11  
 
 C = FT ⋅ F = U2    (14) 
 
Thus strain can be gauged either from the deformation gradient at that point 
or just from the amount whereby line elements stretch or contract.  
Dynamics.  Mechanical continua exert two distinct kinds of actions. One 
is body force, a kinetic efficacy induced by a source directly on any point in-
side a continuous body; such is gravity or electromagnetism. Another type is 
contact stress, or traction. These act on the bounding surface of the body or 
the Euler cut, and are exerted indirectly—through the transmission of 
stress—on points inside the body.12 Their effect is to stretch or compress 
lines, change angles, bend surfaces, and alter volumes: generally, to deform.  
Dynamical laws must then take into account this duality of force. There 
are three principles governing the kinetic actions of continua. (Five, if we in-
clude thermal phenomena, which I leave out here.) One is Conservation of 
Mass, a conjunction of two theses. Here is one:13  
 
m = m*     (15a) 
 
That is, the mass of a continuous body is invariant in all Euclidean frames. 
The other follows from it and the concept of deformation. It is a principle 
known as the Continuity Equation. I give the local form in the material de-
scription:14  
 
ρ0 = Jρ      (15b) 
 
                                                             
11 FT is the transpose of the tensor F.  
12 Strictly speaking, both types are really force densities (volumetric and areal, respectively). For 
each kind, values at a point are obtained by taking limits from values over volumes—or areas, for 
tractions—around that point.   
13 Henceforth the asterisk denotes how an observer in rigid Euclidean motion relative to another 
sees or measures the same quantity as the first observer.  
14 ρ0 is mass density in the reference configuration, ρ in the current (deformed) configuration, 
and J is the Jacobian of the deformation gradient tensor F.   
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The insight behind it is that, as mass remains constant throughout the stress 
action, only deformation can change mass density in a continuous body. The 
second fundamental principle is Cauchy’s First Law, or the Balance Law of 
Linear Momentum. In essence it generalizes Newton’s Lex Secunda in light 
of the dichotomy of force in continuous matter: 
 
ρa = ∇T ⊕ ρb     (16) 
 
Namely, the rate of change in linear momentum of the body equals the gradi-
ent of the external stresses plus the body forces acting on it. The last basic 
principle is Cauchy’s Second Law, or Balance of Angular Momentum. It 
grounds the way in which efficient causes turn continuous volumes around 
axes of rotation: 
 
r × ρa = r × ∇T ⊕ r × ρb    (17)  
 
In words, the time-rate of change in angular momentum—around an arbi-
trary point at distance r from the body—equals the net torque of the body 
forces and contact stresses on a continuous body.  
Objectivity.  As the kinematic possibilities of continua far outnumber 
those of mass-points, the question of mechanical objectivity—the topic of an 
updated Kantian Phenomenology—for a continuous system poses new chal-
lenges. It really has two aspects. One regards the objective behavior of a spe-
cial ‘representative’ point in the body: its mass center, or any centroid more 
generally. This aspect considers the body as a particle, so the question has 
the same answer as it did for mass points—linear acceleration is objective, 
position and velocity are not. But this easy victory wins little; by reducing the 
body to the motion of its centroid, we leave unexplained most of material be-
havior, and turn extension and continuity into idle notions.  
To avoid that, we must include true shape and stress. A different concept 
of objectivity arises then. To grasp it, start with the notion of change of Eu-
clidean frame: let O and O* be observers respectively at rest in two rigid 
frames in arbitrary relative motion. Let the following be functions of time: a 
point function χ, a symmetric tensor T, a vector c, and a proper orthogonal 
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tensor Q.15 Let O observe χ and T at some time t. Then O* will see these two 
magnitudes as χ* and T* given by: 
 
χ* = c ⊕ Q ⋅ χ     (18a) 
 
   T* = Q ⋅ T ⋅ QT    (18b) 
 
Intuitively, this says that O and O* are in rigid motion relative to each other 
as they observe the same two functions.16 Next, define a dynamical process D 
of a continuous body as a pair of fields [χ, T] for a given assignment ρ of mass 
density; and let D* be a process [χ*, T*] for the same ρ. If their respective 
fields are related as in [18a-b] above, the two processes are said to be equiva-
lent. To say that D and D* are equivalent means that the same physical pro-
cess is described by two different arbitrary observers.  
To complete the account, we need the idea of constitutive relations. Intui-
tively, they are differential equation—relating stress and strain—that de-
scribe possible basic ways in which continuous matter responds to applied 
stresses. An infinite number of such ways are possible mathematically, so—
to delimit the class of physically admissible relations—an objectivity condi-
tion is imposed. This constraint is called ‘material frame-indifference.’ One 
way to state it is, “constitutive relations must be invariant under changes of 
reference frame” (Malvern 1969: 389). Namely, if a dynamical process D sat-
isfies a constitutive relation F, then F must also be satisfied for any other 
equivalent process D* as defined above. The crucial thing to note then is that 
a mechanical theory of continuous matter needs two concepts of objectivity, 
or observer-independence: Galilean and Euclidean.       
 
3.  Via regia, and the road not taken 
It should be clear by now that the two approaches I outlined above are mutu-
ally irreducible, since their respective basic objects are radically distinct. One 
is discrete, zero-sized, exerting only Galilean-invariant actions at a distance. 
                                                             
15 A tensor Q is properly orthogonal if the product Q ⋅ QT with its transpose equals 1.  
16 Because c is a rigid translation and Q a rigid rotation or mirror reflection. In other words, [18a-
b] are the Euclidean transformations.  
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The other is continuous, extended, and capable of Euclidean-invariant con-
tact actions. Kant’s foundations cannot accommodate both objects. The rea-
son is his grounding approach: the categories must be applied to matter—
analyzed as mobile, impenetrable, momentum-carrying, observer-
independent objecthood—so as to yield determinate univocal spatio-
temporal content, viz. geometric magnitudes and their time derivatives. We 
do so by specifying the geometric makeup and kinematic content of the terms 
‘body,’ ‘motion,’ ‘force,’ and ‘action.’ But, a univocal specification yields a 
uniquely defined content, and so matter will be either mass-points or deform-
able continua, not both. So, we must decide which of these two is more firmly 
anchorable in his metaphysics.  
One might object that my question has a foregone conclusion: Kant chose 
continuous matter explicitly. In Foundations, he claims to prove that mass 
distribution is continuous at all scales: “Matter is divisible to infinity, and in 
fact into parts such that each is matter in turn” (4:503). And, he argues 
strongly against “physical monads,” i.e. mass-points. So, it is clear which path 
to neoclassical mechanics is legitimate from his standpoint. Still, this is far 
from conclusive. For one, Kant does not much examine whether his pre-
ferred theory of matter coheres with the rest of his foundations, and the truth 
is that it does not (Stan 2014). In fact, a close look at his demarche in Founda-
tions reveals that Kant vacillates between the two approaches I have out-
lined, though he seems unaware of that. Thus, my question stands. Then let 
us examine both approaches, and assess their respective chances and inter-
pretive costs.    
Mass-points.  Grounding their kinematics is uncommonly easy, for Kant 
has done so already, though unintentionally. In ‘Metaphysical Foundations of 
Phoronomy,’ he starts with mobility as an essential property of body, and 
goes on to justify the key principle for the ‘composition of motions,’ viz. an 
addition rule for linear velocity, which he regards as the basic quantity. But, 
he legitimizes that conception with a sleight of hand: 
 
Since in phoronomy nothing is to be at issue except motion, no other property is 
here ascribed to the subject of motion, namely, matter, aside from movability. It 
can itself so far, therefore, also be considered as a point, and one abstracts in 
phoronomy from all inner constitution…. If the expression “body” should never-
theless sometimes be used here, this is only to anticipate to some extent the ap-
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plication of the principles of phoronomy to the more determinate concepts of 
matter that are still to follow. (4:480; my italics) 
 
Satis non est. Point motion is just change in three degrees of kinematic free-
dom. Kant’s doctrine is that bodies are continua, but those are inherently ex-
tended, and have shapes irreducible to points. Ergo, Phoronomy properly 
conceived will be a theory of change in shape. At the very least, Kant ought to 
have made it a theory of infinitesimal fibers ds and their relative motions. 
Then the basic concept of Phoronomy becomes deformation, not point motion 
as he claims. His claim above does not follow from his argument, but is li-
censed by two other considerations. (A) In some contexts, we may abstract 
from the body’s rotations and deformations and treat it as a mass-point, by 
letting the point-motion of a centroid stand for the motion of the extended 
body itself. That is precisely Kant’s practice in Foundations, where his pre-
ferred centroid is the mass center—because he aimed to ground Newton’s 
approach, who in Principia replaces any extended planet with an (extension-
less) mass-point. (B) Or we may regard the body as composed of mass-
points, and then its motion is the sum of its constituents’ point-motions.  
Be that as it may, the fundamental kinematics for the approach (A) is 
very much the basis for (B) too, and so Kant’s mistaken conclusion above be-
comes his felix culpa. It led him to a composition theorem equivalent to [1] 
above. To see that, let a test particle move simultaneously relative to three 
frames themselves in mutual uniform translation at right angles. The parti-
cle’s three motions—relative to each frame—can now be treated as its com-
ponent velocities, and so its ‘composite motion,’ as Kant would call it, be-
comes its linear velocity v as in [1], relative to a (fourth) frame supposed sta-
tionary. Thus in the course of explaining how motion becomes a magnitude, 
Kant justified the fundamental result in particle motion. Even better, if we 
regard the motions in Kant’s account as velocities acquired from rest by a 
particle, it turns out that his explication of ‘composite motion’ can also justify 
the equality [3] above. And, because Kant took ‘composite motion’ to be at 
bottom an addition of inter-frame velocities, naturally his notion also explains 
the Galilean transformation [2] above. Consequently, Kant has already 
grounded the basic kinematics for mass-points, and the interpreter need only 
re-embed it in a broader explanatory framework.     
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The dynamics stage of my inquiry must follow two tracks. We may won-
der first about the chances of embedding in his doctrine the two force spe-
cies—themselves generic—proper to mass-points. Here too the official Kant 
is already of great help. A constant of his natural philosophy was that ‘force’ 
is constitutive of matter.17 One such agency, ‘attraction,’ is just the kind of 
force that mass-points exert too: central, induced by a potential, acting at a 
distance. Kant conceived it on the model of gravity, but was non-committal 
enough to leave its specifics open. Thus he would agree that the law of his 
‘attraction’ takes the general form as in [5] above. However, his other dynam-
ical agency, ‘repulsion,’ defies the interpreter, for in the 1780s he made it a 
contact force, thus incompatible with the mass-point approach. I have two 
remarks to help overcome this obstacle. First, Kant’s account of repulsion is 
not self-standing. It is a corollary of his broader view that matter is a physical 
continuum: “divisible to infinity… into parts such that each is matter in turn,” 
he argues in Proposition 4 of Dynamics (4:503). But, his master argument for 
continuous matter in that Proposition is not unassailable; if we examine it 
critically, it may turn out to be flawed.18 Second, even if his argument is good, 
we can discount it as part of the price for extending his foundations to make 
room for modern mechanics. It is a small price, really: keep his force of re-
pulsion, discard his continuity-of-mass thesis, and the result is repulsive 
force fit for mass-points: just like his attraction, it would be central, acting at 
a distance. Then its force-law will be a species of [5] above. So, it can balance 
Kant’s fundamental ‘attraction,’ thereby co-grounding a notion of least effec-
tive volume as mass-points have. After all, mass-points used to be Kant’s the-
ory of matter in Physical Monadology.19 And so, dropping Proposition 4 gets 
the interpreter a ready-made basis for half of basic particle mechanics.  
What about the other half, the general laws of impressed force? Here too 
the landscape is friendly. Kant in his Phoronomy gives grounding for [3], viz. 
the additivity of linear acceleration. He offers that as the “a priori basis” for 
another key result, the Parallelogram of Forces. Though he does not carry 
                                                             
17 He meant that ‘force’ is a basic attribute—with mobility—in that bodily extension, impenetra-
bility, and ability to transfer momentum are explainable from ‘force.’  
18 For instance, Friedman—virtually alone in having examined it—seems to me hesitant to de-
clare it sound (2013: 150f.). I take comfort in that.   
19 Or one of them—apparently, he flirted with two theories in that paper; cf. Smith 2013.  
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out an actual derivation—alluding instead to the collinearity of force and its 
induced acceleration—Kant is sure that it can be done, and so are some in-
terpreters. 20 If so, Kant has thus secured [7], the additivity of impressed 
force. Still, that is not yet enough for the Second Law. We must still identify 
Kantian resources for [6], the Lex Secunda for single forces. Perhaps an ar-
gument can be made—broadly in tune with the Kant of Friedman’s recent 
work—that [6] is not really a law but an axiom: a postulate, or physical primi-
tive, posited for the sake of rigorous experience. Or, as Friedman has it, for 
making possible the application of mathematics to nature, by exhibiting how 
force becomes a magnitude, i.e. acquires a ratio structure (2013: 237). So, we 
have prima facie reasons to be hopeful about extending to mass-points this 
part of Kant’s foundations, though of course it needs more work.21  
Discarding his Proposition 4 as I urged above would also make the 
Strong Third Law at home in Kant’s metaphysics of nature. He already has a 
good argument for [9], the weak version of Lex Tertia. With attraction and 
repulsion reconceived as actiones in distans, it is easy to show these Kantian 
basic powers are strongly-central. We need only rely on an idea already 
available to him, specifically Lagrange’s Ω-function (Lagrange 1777). The 
function is a mathematical description of the basic agency exerted by mass-
points: a scalar potential whose gradient is a conservative, irrotational vector 
field. In physical terms, if attraction and repulsion are Ω -functions, they obey 
[4]; just re-label ‘P’ as ‘Ω’ to see that. But [4] and [9] entail [10], which means 
that Kant’s mature metaphysics—with physical monads, the direct conse-
quence of deleting Proposition 4—support the Strong Third Law, hence the 
two basic laws of point-mass dynamics.   
And so we come to objectivity and the task of extending Kant’s Phenom-
enology. The prolegomenon to a solution, I believe, is to note a deep ambigui-
ty in his theory of motion. On the one hand, modern interpretations (based on 
Friedman’s highly consilient reading) strongly imply that Kant lets true mo-
                                                             
20 See Friedman (2013: 377-9) and Stan (2014: 429). Still, we should give this matter careful scruti-
ny. Attempts to ground the Parallelogram of Forces are notoriously thorny, and it is not yet clear 
that, even by 18th-century standards of physical proof, Kant’s derivation would succeed.   
21 Additionally, we would have to supplement Kant’s conception of mass. In the 1780s, he thinks 
of it just in terms of active powers—of transferring momentum and ‘imparting motion’ by accel-
eration fields—but hardly as the measure of resistance to acceleration. That is unfortunate, 
especially as in Physical Monadology Kant had a clear conception of mass as resistance to force.    
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tion be the kinematic quantity satisfying his ‘mechanical laws.’ This idea cou-
pled now with a ontology of mass-points entails that true motion is that which 
arbitrary inertial observers would measure by applying the laws [6] through 
[10]. Specifically, it is linear acceleration, because those laws are Galilean-
relative. On the other hand, Kant throughout his philosophical maturity was 
wedded to the early modern idea that the laws of motion are ‘true relative to’ 
a preferred frame, viz. absolute space. However, this makes true motion—
thus objective behavior—be a preferred velocity, or rate of change in dis-
tance to the privileged frame. That runs against the first strand of thought 
above, and also against our modern view of objectivity.  
That is the conundrum. To break it, I recommend adopting the modern 
view that Kant lets the laws themselves define objective mechanical behav-
ior; and adjust the Phenomenology—construed à la manière de Friedman—
to the dynamical laws of point masses. As far as I can tell in advance, the only 
drastic correction will involve Kant’s doctrine of necessary motion, admitted-
ly the acme of Phenomenology. Officially, Kant construes it as true velocity, 
whose necessity is allegedly conceptual: it “follows immediately and una-
voidably from the concept of the relation of the moved in space to anything 
else movable thereby” (4:558, my italics).22 That becomes untenable in the 
project pursued here. Like Friedman, we ought to re-read ‘necessary motion’ 
as true acceleration, whose necessity is special-metaphysical, or grounded in 
Kant’s ‘special metaphysics of material nature.’ The Second Law, now added 
explicitly to that edifice, entails that any force on a body, or set of mass-
points, induces an objective acceleration on it. Lex Tertia then makes it nec-
essary that any body experiences an objective acceleration in proportion to 
its action on other bodies, because all impressed forces necessarily are inter-
actions, by the Third Analogy.23     
Continuous matter.  Let us now move on to the other paradigm, and as-
sess it for ease of retrofit to Kant’s metaphysical foundations. It seems we 
should be hopeful about grounding its fundamental kinematics. Recall that a 
                                                             
22 He means that, just by a conceptual analysis of ‘relative motion,’ we can establish that two 
interacting bodies have true velocities relative to each other, in the mass-center frame (Stan 
2013).  
23 It is not clear what role is left for Kant’s absolute space to play. The dynamical laws pick out a 
family of equivalent frames, not a single preferred reference system.  
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continuum motion generaliter is composed of a rigid translation t, a rigid ro-
tation R and a pure stretch U. And, Kant sees his task in Phoronomy precise-
ly as supplying a priori principles to exhibit the “concept of a composite mo-
tion” in pure intuition (4:487). So, we might expect the core grounding to be in 
place already. But this hope is short-lived. Kant sees composition of motions 
as homogeneous in two senses: it is a uniform operation, vector addition; and 
is a “composition of the homogeneous” in that it adds up motions of the same 
kind (4:495; cf. also Sutherland 2014). But continuum motion is heterogeneous 
on both counts. It involves vector addition and tensor multiplication; see [11] 
and [13] above. And, it combines different species of displacements. More 
seriously, Kant’s basic kinematic object is of the wrong kind for continua. His 
relevant entity is “the motion of a point” (4:489). But in continuum kinematics 
the fundamental object is the infinitesimal fiber, not the point, so any inter-
pretive attempt to anchor continuum motion in his metaphysical foundations 
of phoronomy is bound to violate the letter of Kant’s doctrine. Perhaps we 
can retain its spirit, at least? For instance, by discarding wholesale Kant’s 
outdated geometric approach to kinematics, and replacing it with ‘composi-
tion’ as in linear algebra, i.e. as combination of elements in a vector space. I 
cannot judge the feasibility of this proposal in advance, but I must warn that 
ultimately it will need anchoring in Kant’s categories of quantity, as his foun-
dational program requires. Thus, so far continua seem a good deal harder to 
embed in his phoronomy.     
Next, it appears that updating his Dynamics, or theory of matter, is easi-
est. After all, he does have the continuity of mass and a distinction between 
‘penetrating’ and ‘surface’ actions, i.e. body forces and stresses (4:516). And 
yet, even here some reconceptualization is needed. Kant really ought to start 
with a notion of force density—specifically, amount of body force per unit 
volume and of stress per unit area. Values at a point, needed for equations of 
motion, are then obtained by taking limits, viz. letting these units shrink to a 
volume element dV and area element dA, respectively. Thus, not even this 
chapter of Foundations would survive intact the evolution of subsequent me-
chanics. 
On to the dynamical laws, then. Kant saw insightfully that a mechanics of 
continua needs Conservation of Mass, which he linked firmly to his meta-
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physics through the First Analogy of Experience. But, his architectonic ap-
proach to grounding yields gains and losses. If we follow his lead, we can at 
best generalize his procedure to cover inertia of rotation and the equality of 
impressed torques. However, it is far from clear how the interpreter might 
make room for principles that really drive theory-building in this mechanics, 
viz. Cauchy’s two laws [16] and [17] above. The latter principle is probably not 
out of bounds for Kant: it is derivable as a theorem, provided we allow on 
Kant’s behalf that the stress tensor T, the basic measure of contact action, is 
symmetric. Still, that raises again, more pressingly than ever, the question 
whether the Second Law for single forces is anywhere in Kant’s metaphysical 
foundations, and how in its absence he might be credited with it.  
I think there is a heuristic out of this predicament, and it appears feasi-
ble. Friedman once ascribed to Kant the view that Lex Secunda was implicit 
in his ‘mechanical’ laws of inertia and of action-reaction (1992: 143). I suggest 
reviving that idea in the context of rational reconstruction rather than textual 
hermeneutics.24 More generally, I think we may regard the Second Law (and 
its correlate for rotation) as “bridge laws” between the purely metaphysical, 
qualitative principles of force and action, and the mathematically-redescribed 
‘mechanical’ appearances, i.e. phenomena of motion conceived as trans-
placements. This would keep the spirit while correcting the letter of Kant’s 
Foundations as an explanatory project of how mathematics can apply to ap-
pearance and turn it into mechanical experience, paradigmatically.  
Still, I am hard pressed to see any Kantian path to grounding objectivity 
for continua. Granted, Kant apparently had a relativity principle compatible 
with Newton’s Corollary Six. However, even that is too weak for the objectivi-
ty at issue here, which is really Euclidean relativity, as it were: invariance 
across rigid frames, translating and rotating relate to each other. But Corol-
lary Six holds only in a proper subset of the equivalence class of all Euclidean 
frames. Nor is there any hint of how this notion might be reconciled with 
Kant’s categories of modality. Because continuum objectivity does not single 
out inertial frames, the interpreter cannot just transfer the stepwise approx-
                                                             
24 There is textual support for my suggestion. Kant regards his ‘dynamical’ repulsion and attrac-
tion as forces of “imparting motion” whereby they generate momentum increments. And, his 
indirect proof of the Equality of Action and Reaction assumes that actions are impressed forces 
that generate linear accelerations (4:536; 562f.). These claims presuppose the Second Law.   
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imating procedure outlined in the Phenomenology—as Friedman and others 
read it—and invoke the modal category appropriate for each stage.25 Contin-
uum objectivity is a constraint meant to determine ‘real’ or ‘intrinsic’ materi-
al properties—codified by the body’s response to stress, not just by the mo-
tion of its mass center, which Kant singled out for treatment in Phenomenol-
ogy. It is the presence and special nature of stress and strain, which mass-
points lack and cannot support, that requires a second, distinct concept of 
objectivity for continuous matter.   
 
4.  Balance and conclusions  
In sum, to ground continuum theory in Kant’s metaphysics of nature, we 
would need to discard his Phoronomy and replace it wholesale; retool the 
mathematics of his Dynamics—and generally replace his geometric methods 
with the partial-differential calculus; supplement his Mechanics with two 
highly non-trivial principles; and regard his Phenomenology as incomplete, in 
need of extension by another concept of objectivity, material frame-
indifference.  
In turn, adopting mass-points would leave the Phoronomy mostly unal-
tered; leave the Dynamics in place, save for the untenable Definition 4; re-
quire us to make explicit the source and status of the Second Law in his Me-
chanics; and prompt us to clarify his idea of true motion in Phenomenology.  
With the initial estimate of interpretive costs behind us, which of the two 
approaches is preferable? On balance, mass-points appear a good deal less 
radical and invasive. Continuum theory requires strong foundations, and I 
am really not sure that Kant’s metaphysics can provide them or even that it 
needs to do so.         
Another point against the continuum approach is that Kant’s project pur-
sues a stringent notion of metaphysical grounding, and so it places strong 
constraints on any attempt to extend or update it. Specifically, explanation in 
it flows from the categories and transcendental principles, through the con-
cept of matter and its attributes, to basic mechanical theory. But, keeping 
continuous matter makes it very hard to live up to this ideal, hence give a 
                                                             
25 Of course, inertial frames remain indispensable—the laws of continuum mechanics hold just 
relative to them, not generally.   
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Kantian grounding for neoclassical mechanics. That is because, if we keep 
Kant’s physical continuum, we must supply what he lacks—everything else, 
really. In effect, we would have to build fundamental kinematics and dynam-
ics, the results [11] through [18] above, from the ground up, i.e. from Kant’s 
analysis of matter—and then retrofit them to his constitutive apparatus im-
ported from the First Critique. How to carry this out is utterly unclear to me, 
yet it must be done or else we betray Kant’s foundational thrust, which ren-
ders hollow any victory so obtained. In contrast, mass-points satisfy Kant’s 
strong constraint very well. He had already shown—accidentally, as he re-
jected them in theory—that they instantiate his categories of quantity, rela-
tion, and modality. It is quite easy now to argue that they cohere with the cat-
egories of quality too: they bear the same basic forces as his continuum, and 
the continuity of mass distribution has no import on category-instantiation.     
Here is another reason to extend Kant in line with the first approach. 
Note how little disruptive it is to anchor mass-point mechanics in his doc-
trine. That is because the doctrine is really a palimpsest. The architectonic of 
categories gives it a monolithic façade, but behind it two different modes of 
thought, particulate and continuous, are superimposed. Thanks to Smith 
(2013), now we know that Kant always wavered between these two views of 
matter. Officially a mass-point theorist in Physical Monadology, Kant there 
at times lets the continuum picture take over unannounced. In Foundations, 
he commits to continuous matter, and yet he cannot let go of the particulate 
approach specific to mass-points. Then, seeing as his foundation is really a 
heterogeneous blend, the interpreter should not be afraid to purify it by re-
moving extraneous ingredients. In my view, taking the mass-point approach 
amounts to proper purification: it retains the essence of Kant’s philosophy of 
mechanics while increasing its strength. In contrast, the continuum ap-
proach would dilute it beyond recognition merely to preserve just one com-
mitment out of so many that Kant expressed in Foundations. 
A last but compelling reason to embed mass-points into Kant’s metaphys-
ics is that they make continuum theory foundationally dispensable. This is 
not immediately apparent, but emerges in hindsight from the long-term 
growth of mechanics. Modeling matter as continuous is needed just at cer-
tain scales, not universally, and mass-points have proven resilient enough to 
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allow that. Specifically, modern mathematical tools, calibrated for the desired 
scale, enable mechanics to start with discrete point masses and define from 
them continuous fields as needed.26 So, it turns out that mass-points are the 
better matter theory for classical dynamics, and the physical continuum is a 
local, reducible phenomenon. Then we need not saddle Kant with it as we 
bring him into the present.  
I end with a parting note, not unimportant. Readers will wonder how my 
key thesis—that we ought to commit Kant to a kind of physical monads—is 
compatible with his Second Antinomy and its injunction against them. My 
answer is brief here, but it deserves elaboration elsewhere. In two respects, 
my result is orthogonal to Kant’s concerns in the Antinomy. For one, I do not 
advance it as a thesis in transcendental realism, viz. about the architecture of 
matter as Ding an sich. On the contrary: it is about the microstructure of the 
substratum, itself phenomenal, of all appearances in outer sense. It recom-
mends an ontology inferable from phenomena—of motions and deformations 
given at mesoscopic scales and above—by a systematic use of Kant’s Postu-
lates of Empirical Thought. Then my result is in line with his broader project 
in the Analytic, just as I promised at the outset. Because of that (now this is 
another respect) my reasoning is safe from Kant’s censure in the Antino-
mies. I did not reach my conclusions by mere analysis from mere concepts, 
aided by the Principle of Sufficient Reason—as Wolff and the practitioners of 
‘rational cosmology’ did, thus earning Kant’s rebuke. Rather, I ascribed to 
Kant mass-points as the best ontological explanation of all determinate phe-
nomena of motion in a Galilean regime. As such, my inference is beyond 
Kantian reproach, for it does not claim for itself any greater certainty than he 
believed he had secured for his own principles in Foundations.    
In conclusion, there is a promising case that Kant’s ‘special metaphysics 
of material nature’ remains viable and relevant. As I have explained, that is 
due to his insightful grounding of mechanics in a robust, resilient constitution 
theory of mechanical objecthood; and to the changing but ultimately happy 
fortunes of classical mechanics itself. In regard to the former, Kant’s far-
sighted kinematic and dynamical foundations permit an ontology of mass-
                                                             
26 The first effort along these lines was Irving and Kirkwood 1950; the latest, most detailed ex-
pression is Murdoch 2012.  
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points to be embedded without much disruption—though not the continua he 
embraced in the Critical decade. As to the latter, while Einstein did curtail 
the once imperial ambitions of mechanics, in the end a vast swathe of deter-
minate experience still unfolds at speeds and scales for which classical theo-
ry remains indispensable. Thus, thanks to his relentless and deep engage-
ment with it, Kant’s mechanical foundations remain the most important lega-
cy of early modern natural philosophy.   
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